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Abstract
Social acceptance is a multifaceted consideration when planning future energy systems, yet often challenging to address
endogeneously. One key aspect regards the spatial distribution of investments. Here, I evaluate the cost impact and
changes in optimal system composition when development of infrastructure is more evenly shared among countries and
regions in a fully renewable European power system. I deliberately deviate from the resource-induced cost optimum
towards more equitable and self-sufficient solutions in terms of power generation. The analysis employs the open
optimisation model PyPSA-Eur. I show that cost optimal solutions lead to very inhomogenous distributions of assets,
but more uniform expansion plans can be achieved on a national level at little additional expense below 4%. Yet
completely autarkic solutions, without power transmission, appear much more costly.
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(i) Imbalances in 2018 according to ENTSO-E [1]
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(ii) Imbalances in optimised fully renewable system
(GR=308%, NL=360%, DK=874%)
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Figure 1: Imbalances today and in optimised renewable system.
1. Introduction
Optimising for a renewable power system was observed
to entail a very heterogenous distribution of electricity gen-
eration in relation to demand when compared to national
imbalances reported by ENTSO-E for 2018 (Figure 1) [1].
The system is dominated by many distinct net importers
and exporters, whereas few supply just their own demand.
This raises concerns about distributional equity.
Blindly following the cost optimum risks inequitable
outcomes and public headwind, bearing the potential of
decelerating the energy transition. Particularly wind farms
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and transmission lines spark local opposition, which was
found to be best counteracted by including the public in
the planning process and by sharing profits [2]. Vice versa,
also the absence of investments may have a detrimental
impact on local communities.
Beyond the spatial distribution of generation invest-
ments, numerous other dimensions of energy justice and
equity principles exist [3]. Equity metrics can also relate to
temporal, income, racial, labor and environmental aspects
[4–6], and perceptions of fairness vary among stakehold-
ers [7, 8]. Recent developments of pan-continental models
with growing sub-national detail raise the need for recog-
nising their regional implications [6, 9]. However, aspects
of fairness are challenging to assess in endogenous mod-
elling and analyses have so far been limited to ex-post
analysis [6]. Enhanced collaboration between social scien-
tists and energy modellers has been encouraged [10].
Moreover, there is a trend towards discussing energy
autarky, i.e. the ability to operate regions partially or com-
pletely independently [11, 12]. Positive associations with
autonomy, control and independence drive aspirations for
self-sufficiency for individuals and municipalities alike, and
result in a higher willingness to pay and greater support
for projects [12–15]. The debate also evolves around the
resilience of more decentralised systems [16]. The primary
resource-based feasibility of autarkic systems on different
spatial levels was evaluated in Tro¨ndle et al. [17]. High
population density was found to sometimes be a limiting
factor for small autarkic systems. Weinand et al. found
that about half of the 6000 municipalities in Germany have
sufficient potentials to become off-grid municipalities [18].
Further related work has assessed the benefit of trans-
mission capacities between countries [19] and more het-
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Figure 2: Lorenz curves for different equity requirements relating the
cumulative share of electricity generation to the cumulative share of
demand in the 200 regions of the European power system model.
erogeneous distributions of generation assets [20]. It has
moreover been evaluated what range of similarly costly
but possibly more socially acceptable power systems can
be realised [21] and what costs are incurred by reducing
eligible potentials [22]. Previous work on distributional eq-
uity regarding power generation has however covered only
a single country and neglected the variability of renewable
generation and demand, as well as the interaction between
storage and transmission infrastructure [3, 23]. A cost as-
sessment of regional autarkic systems in Europe compared
to the least-cost system does not appear to exist yet.
In this contribution, I remedy the concerns about spa-
tial scope and temporal resolution and explore at what
cost more evenly distributed, or even autarkic, power sup-
ply could be achieved in Europe, regarding both countries
and smaller regions.
2. Model Setup
I use the open European transmission system model
PyPSA-Eur with 200 nodes and 4380 snapshots, one for
every two hours in a year [24]. I solve a long-term power
system planning problem which seeks to minimise the to-
tal annual system costs comprising generation, transmis-
sion and storage infrastructure in a fully renewable sys-
tem. The objective is subject to linear constraints that
define limits on (i) the capacities of infrastructure from
geographical and technical potentials, (ii) the availability
of variable renewable energy sources for each location and
point in time derived from reanalysis weather data, and
(iii) linearised multi-period optimal power flow (LOPF)
constraints including storage consistency equations.
I add constraints for each country or node to produce
on average at least a given share of their annual consump-
tion; i.e. I explore the sensitivity of increasing production
equity requirements. The extreme cases are (i) every coun-
try or node produces as much as required for the cost-
optimal system using the most productive locations (0%)
and (ii) every country or node produces as much as they
consume (100%). The experiments interpolate between
the extremes in steps of 10%.
I further extend this setup by two experiments regard-
ing absolute autarky: (i) one where there is no cross-
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Figure 3: National annual investment relative to annual demand
when every country produces as much as they consume (100%).
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Figure 4: Total system cost impact of autarky on national and nodal
levels compared to optimal solution and maximal equity constraints.
border transmission of power between countries but which
includes the intranational transmission grid, and (ii) one
where each node fully supplies its own power demand at
any time in isolation. The code to reproduce all results is
available at github.com/fneum/equity-and-autarky.
3. Results and Discussion
The discussion of results employs system costs, the
technology mix, as well as the distribution of power sys-
tem infrastructure investments as evaluation criteria, both
regarding equity and autarky considerations.
Foremost, Figure 5 displays the sensitivity of system
costs towards nodal and country-wide equity requirements.
Similar graphics were produced regarding the amount of
cross-border transmission capacities by Schlachtberger et
al. [19]. National equity constraints cause a limited rise
in total system cost. The cost increase by less than 4%
when every country produces as much as they consume;
and by less than 2% when each produces at least 80%.
They entail less grid reinforcement and some more solar
installations. Conversely, the cost sensitivity is consid-
erably higher for nodal equity constraints. When every
node on average produces all they consume, costs inflate
by 18%; and already at equity levels of 50% costs increase
by 5%. Note, that the sensitivity is nonlinear. Nodal re-
quirements shift expansion plans towards onshore wind,
solar and hydrogen storage, while reducing network ex-
pansion and offshore wind capacities. This confirms but
also extends on a finding by Sasse et al. [3]: indeed so-
lar contributes to regional equity, but also onshore wind
does. This is ambivalent since onshore wind is susceptible
to local opposition.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity of system cost and composition to nodal and country-wide equity requirements.
The maps of optimal system capacities in Figure 6 show
less but still substantial amounts of transmission expan-
sion in the case of nodal equity. Compared to the unre-
stricted optimal solution, the deployment of solar panels
progresses northbound and onshore wind capacities spread
in Northern and Eastern Europe. Moreover, storage in-
frastructure distributes more evenly.
Figure 2 depicts Lorenz curves as equity measures for
different equity constraints (cf. [3]). They relate the cu-
mulative share of electricity generation to the cumulative
share of demand in the 200 regions of the model. The
Lorenz curve is on the identity line if annual sums of gen-
eration and load are equal at each node. While nodal
equity requirements by definition lift the Lorentz curve,
national requirements maintains an unequal distribution
of infrastructure within each country.
According to Li et al. [9], winners are those who receive
high per-capita investments. Results show that, when ev-
ery country balances generation and load on average, the
national annual investments relative to demand are more
evenly distributed, ranging between 40 and 100 e/MWh
(Figure 3). Generation infrastructure dominates invest-
ments followed by storage and transmission. The absence
of extreme winners and losers is favourable.
While even nodal production equity raises costs only
to a limited extent below 20%, absolute autarky is signif-
icantly more costly already on a national level. Figure 4
shows that eliminating cross-border transmission capaci-
ties (i.e. no trade of power between countries) adds costs
beyond 40%. Costs rise even more when each of the 200 re-
gions is fully self-sufficient. With an additional 85%, costs
almost doubled compared to the least-cost solution.
One critical factor concerns the land use requirements
for solar in the nodal autarky scenario. Assuming an even
split between utility and rooftop PV, results reveal that
no region uses more than 3% of its area for utility PV and
only one in ten regions uses more than 1%. It further needs
to be noted that hydrogen storage in salt caverns, as the
cheaper alternative to steel tanks if the geological condi-
tions admit it, was neglected. In future work, the autarky
analysis should be repeated for a fully sector-coupled en-
ergy system which includes transport options for chemical
energy carriers.
4. Conclusion
It is possible to strike a balance between cost-efficiency
and fair distribution of investments at little additional ex-
pense. Aligning annual generation and consumption per
country costs less than 4% more; per node the costs in-
crease by 18%. National balancing however retains inho-
mogenous distributions within the countries. Finally, even
when each node produces as much as they consume, power
is still extensively transmitted and regions are not self-
sufficient. True autarky solutions without power transmis-
sion are in relation substantially more expensive. Knowl-
edge about the observed degree of freedom is important
considering that more even investment per region can lead
to better political feasibility, quicker implementation, and
higher social acceptance.
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